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Abstract- The problems with the current researches on intrusion detection using data mining 
approach are that they try to minimize the error rate (make the classification decision to minimize the 
probability of error) by totally ignoring the cost that could be incurred. However, for many problem 
domains, the requirement is not merely to predict the most probable class label, since different types 
of errors carry different costs. Instances of such problems include authentication, where the cost of 
allowing unauthorized access can be much greater than that of wrongly denying access to 
authorized individuals, and intrusion detection, where raising false alarms has a substantially lower 
cost than allowing an undetected intrusion. In such cases, it is preferable to make the classification 
decision that has minimum cost, rather than that with the lowest error rate.For this reason, we 
examine how cost-sensitive machine learning methods can be used in Intrusion Detection systems. 
The performance of the approach is evaluated under different experimental conditions and different 
models in comparison with the KDD Cup 99 winner resultsin terms of average misclassification cost, 
as well as detection accuracy and false positive ratesthough the winner used original KDD dataset 
whereas for this research NSL-KDD dataset which is new version of the original KDD cup data and it 
is better than the original dataset in that it has no redundant data is used.   
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Abstract- The problems with the current researches on 
intrusion detection using data mining approach are that they 
try to minimize the error rate (make the classification decision 
to minimize the probability of error) by totally ignoring the cost 
that could be incurred. However, for many problem domains, 
the requirement is not merely to predict the most probable 
class label, since different types of errors carry different costs. 
Instances of such problems include authentication, where the 
cost of allowing unauthorized access can be much greater 
than that of wrongly denying access to authorized individuals, 
and intrusion detection, where raising false alarms has a 
substantially lower cost than allowing an undetected intrusion. 
In such cases, it is preferable to make the classification 
decision that has minimum cost, rather than that with the 
lowest error rate.For this reason, we examine how cost-
sensitive machine learning methods can be used in Intrusion 
Detection systems. The performance of the approach is 
evaluated under different experimental conditions and different 
models in comparison with the KDD Cup 99 winner resultsin 
terms of average misclassification cost, as well as detection 
accuracy and false positive ratesthough the winner used 
original KDD dataset whereas for this research NSL-KDD 
dataset which is new version of the original KDD cup data and 
it is better than the original dataset in that it has no redundant 
data is used.  For comparison of results of CS-MC4, CS-CRT 
and KDD winner result, it was found that CS-MC4 is superior 
to CS-CRT in terms of accuracy, false positives rate and 
average misclassification costs. CS-CRT is superior to KDD 
winner result in accuracy and average misclassification costs 
but in false positives rate KDD winner result is better than both 
CS-MC4 and CS-CRT classifiers. 
Keywords: intrusion detection, data mining, cost sens-
itive learning. 
I. Introduction 
he field of intrusion detection has received 
increasing attention in recent years. One reason is 
the explosive growth of the Internet and the large 
number of networked systems that exist in all types of 
organizations. The increased number of networked 
machines has led to a rise in unauthorized activity, not 
only from external attackers but also from internal sour-
ces such as disgruntled employees and people abusing 
their privileges for personal gain [26].Since intrusions 
take advantage of vulnerabilities in computer systems or 
use socially engineered penetration techniques,intrusion 
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detection (ID) is often used as  another  wall  of 
protection. Intrusion detection includes identifying a set 
of malicious actions that compromise the integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability of information resources. 
Enough data exists or could be collected to 
allow network administrators to detect any violations. 
Unfortunately, the data is so volumes, and the analysis 
process so time consuming that the administrators don’t 
have the resources to go through it all and find the 
relevant knowledge, save for the most exceptional 
situations [30].Given the nature of this problem, the 
possible solution is data mining approach[3], [30]. 
Data mining approach for intrusion detection 
techniques generally fall into one of two categories; 
misuse detection and anomaly detection. In misuse 
detection, each instance in a data set is labeled as 
‘normal’ or ‘intrusion’ and a learning algorithm is trained 
over the labeled data. These techniques are able to 
automatically retrain intrusion detection models on 
different input data that include new types of attacks, as 
long as they have been labeled appropriately. Unlike 
manual intrusion detection systems, models of misuse 
are created automatically, and can be more 
sophisticated and precise than manually created 
signatures. A key advantage of misuse detection 
techniques is their high degree of accuracy in detecting 
known attacks and their variations. Their obvious 
drawback is the inability to detect attacks whose 
instances have not yet been observed.  
Anomaly detection, on the other hand, builds 
models of normal behavior, and automatically detects 
any deviation from it, flagging the latter as suspect. 
Anomaly detection techniques thus identify new types of 
intrusions as deviations from normal usage [5]. While an 
extremely powerful and novel tool, a potential draw-back 
of these techniques is the rate of false alarms. This can 
happen primarily because previously unseen (yet 
legitimate) system behaviors may also be recognized as 
anomalies, and hence flagged as potential intrusions. 
Hybrid IDS combine bothmethods and it is better one 
[22]. 
The problem with the current researches is that 
they try to minimize the error rate (make the 
classification decision to minimize the probability of 
error) by totally ignoring the cost that could be incurred.  
However, for many problem domains, the requirement is 
not merely to predict the most probable class label, 
since different types of errors carry different costs [10]. 
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For  example of such problem in the case of computer 
network security include authentication, where the cost 
of allowing unauthorized access can be much greater 
than that of wrongly denying access to authorized 
individuals, and intrusion detection, where raising false 
alarms has a substantially lower cost than allowing an 
undetected intrusion. In such cases, it is preferable to 
make the classification decision that has minimum 
expected cost, rather than that with the lowest error 
probability [23].  
Another very important case is, if class 
imbalanced datasets occurs but this happens in many 
real-world applications where the class distributions of 
data are highly imbalanced [23]. Again, it is assumed 
that the minority or rare class is the positive class, and 
the majority class is the negative class. Often the 
minority class is very small, such as 1% of the dataset. If 
most traditional (cost insensitive) classifiers are applied 
on the dataset, they will likely to predict everything as 
negative (the majority class) [33]. 
The intrusion data used for this research, KDD 
data set, which is publicly available and most widely 
used data set, has class distributions of training and test 
datasets with different distribution and each attack types 
has different costs. Statistically, the attacks of U2R and 
R2L are of the rarest, which makes them very hard to 
predict. On the other hand, they are the most dangerous 
types. Once an attacker gains the super user right or 
successfully remote login, disasters of the whole system 
are nothing but unavoidable [19]. 
Comparably, attacks of Probe are not that much 
dangerous. Although attacks of DOS (denial of service) 
are massive in the whole original dataset, they impose 
less danger. This is because the nature of denial of 
service attacks lies in that they are trying to initiate as 
many as possible connections to consume the network 
traffics and server CPU time [19]. 
Because of the above mentioned reasons cost 
sensitive learning which considers cost in decision 
making with acceptable accuracy is better solution for 
computer network intrusion detection. We used cost 
sensitive learning algorithms, cost sensitive 
classification tree CS-CRT and cost sensitive decision 
tree CS-MC4 algorithms. These algorithms use 
misclassification cost matrix to minimize the expected 
cost and for the detection of best prediction. Yet despite 
its importance, the topic is seldom addressed and 
researched.  
II. Intrusion Detection, Cost Sensitive 
Machine Learning and Performance 
Measure 
An intrusion detection system attempts to 
detect intrusions. In this paper, we focus on network-
based systems, i.e., network intrusion detection systems 
(NIDS) whose primary source of data is network traffic. 
In contrast, there is host intrusion detection systems 
(HIDS) which rely on information gathered on individual 
hosts. Hybrid systems are both network-based and 
host-based [5], [22]. 
a) Classification of intrusion detection based on 
different detection method 
i. Misuse Detection 
It is also named signature-based detection, 
which can transform the information of attack symptom 
or policy disobeying into state transition-based signature 
or rule, and such information is stored in signature 
database. To judge whether or not it is attack, pre-
treated case data should be first compared with the 
signature of signature database, and those conforming 
to attack signature data can be judged as attack [22]. 
Its advantage is high detection rate and low false alarm 
rate for known attacks; however, its detection capacity is 
low for unknown detection methods, and attack 
database should be renewed on a regular basis. 
ii. Anomaly Detection 
It may establish a profiles for normal behavior of 
users, which comes from statistics data of users in the 
former period; when detection is performed, the profiles 
is compared with actual users’ data, if the offset is below 
threshold value, user’s behavior can be considered 
normal, and it has no intention of attacks; if the offset is 
above threshold value, user’s behavior can be 
considered abnormal [22]. Anomaly detection is based 
on an assumption that intruder’s behavior is different 
from normal users’ behavior. Detection rate of the 
method is high, and it is more likely to detect unknown 
attacks, but misjudgment (false positive) rate is also 
high. 
iii. Hybrid  
It  is  also  possible  to  include  both  normal  
and  attack  data  in  the model.  Such systems are 
referred to be hybrid detectors. 
 
Figure 1 :  The relation between misuse detection and anomaly detection.
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b)  Architecture 
In general, a NIDS consists of different components.  
1. Collector: Provides an interface for accessing data 
that is used by the detection process. For a NIDS, 
the primary kind of data collector is a network tap. 
A tap provides access to all raw network packets 
which cross a particular position of a network.  
2. Detector: Conducts the actual detection process. 
The detector is the “brain" of the NIDS. It accesses 
data provided by collector and storage (see 
below), and it decides what should trigger an alert. 
3. User Interface: Reports results to the user, and 
enables the user to control the NIDS.  
4. Storage:  Stores persistent data required by the 
detector or the user interface. Such data is either 
derived by the detector itself or provided externally. 
5. Responder:  Reacts to detected intrusions in order 
to prevent future damage. Active responses may 
include dropping the connectivity to the potential 
attacker or even counter-attacks. A response may 
be triggered automatically or manually via the user 
interface. 
 
 
Figure 2 : NIDS architecture 
III. Cost Sensitive Machine Learning 
Costs are central to statistical decision theory 
but cost sensitive learning received only modest 
attention before [19]. Cost sensitive learning is a type of 
learning in data mining that takes the misclassification 
costs (and possibly other types of cost) into 
consideration. The goal of this type of learning is to 
minimize the total cost. The key difference between cost 
sensitive learning and cost insensitive learning is that 
cost sensitive learning treats the different 
misclassifications differently. Cost insensitive learning 
does not take the misclassification costs into 
consideration. The goal of this type of learning is to 
practice a high accuracy of classifying examples into a 
set of known classes. 
Cost sensitive learning is an extensively used 
practice in data mining, which assigns different levels of 
misclassification penalty to each class. Cost sensitive 
technique has been incorporated into classification 
algorithms by taking into account the cost information 
and trying to optimize the overall cost during the 
learning process.  
a) Cost Models 
The cost model of IDS devises the total 
expected cost of the IDS. The cost model depends on 
the detection performance of the IDS. Misclassification 
costs false positive (FP, the cost of misclassifying a 
negative instance into positive) and false negative (FN, 
the cost of misclassifying a positive instance into 
negative), and the cost of correct classification is zero. 
They simply assign FP as the weight to each negative 
instance, and assign FN as the weight to each positive 
instance. That is, the weight ratio of a positive instance 
to a negative instance is proportional to FN/FP [9], [19]. 
The cost of misclassifying an instance of class i 
as class j is C(i, j ) and is assumed to be equal to 1 
unless specified otherwise(i, i ) = 0 for all i . Any 
classification tree can have a total cost computed for its 
terminal node assignments by summing costs over all 
misclassifications. The issue in cost sensitive learning is 
to induce a tree that takes the costs into account during 
its growing and pruning phases [19]. These 
misclassification cost values can be given by domain 
experts, or learned via other approaches. In cost 
sensitive learning, it is usually assume that such a cost 
matrix is given and known. For multiple classes, the cost 
matrix can be easily extended by adding more rows and 
more columns. 
 
 
 
 When optimizing sampling levels to improve 
overall cost, a logical evaluation criterion is the cost 
itself. Cost is calculated as follows by taking the assu-
mption C (+|+) = C (-|-) =0.Cost = FNratex C (-|+) + 
FPratex C (+|-). Therefore, once classification occurs in 
the cross-validation phase, the wrapper or filter 
calculates the validation cost and uses this information 
to select optimal sampling levels. This approach is 
 Actual negative Actual positive 
Predict negative C(0,0), or TN C(0,1), or FN 
 Predict positive C(1,0), or FP C(1,1), or TP 
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Table 1: An example of cost matrix for binary 
classification.
dependent on a priori knowledge of the cost relationship 
between classes [10].  Cost sensitive learning algorithm 
which directly introduce and make use of misclassific-
ation costs into the learning algorithms are ICET, EG2, 
CS-ID3, CS-MC4 and CS-CRT. The cost sensitive 
learning algorithms that are used for this research are 
cost sensitive learning algorithms i.e. cost sensitive 
decision tree CS-MC4 which is  the cost sensitive ver-
sion of C4.5and CS-CRT the cost sensitive version of C-
RT classification tree that use misclassification cost 
matrix to minimize the expected cost and for the 
detection of best prediction.   
b) Performance Measures 
detection rate, low false alarm rate and lower average 
misclassification cost. The followings are commonly 
used performance measures 
i. Error Rate 
The error rate, which is only an estimate of the 
true error rate and is expressed to be a good estimate, if 
the number of test data is large and representative of 
the population and is defined as 
[68]: 
Error Rate = %100×−
amplesTotalTests
sfiedsamplectlyclassiTotalCorreamplesTotalTests
 
ii. Accuracy 
Overall Classification accuracy (OCA) is the 
most essential measure of the performance of a 
classifier. It determines the proportion of correctly 
classified examples in relation to the total number of 
examples of the test set i.e. the ratio of true positives 
and true negatives to the total number of examples.  
 
From the confusion matrix, we can say that [9] 
accuracy is the percentage of correctly classified 
instances over the total number of instances in total 
data, namely the situation TP and TN, thus accuracy can 
be defined as follows: 
                       
 Accuracy=   %100
ln
ln
×
tsamplesumberoftesTota
lessifiedsamprectlyclasumberofcorTota
 
Or
 
Accuracy = %100×
+++
+
FNFPTNTP
TNTP
iii. Detection Rate
 
Detection rate refers to the proportion of attack detected among all attack data, namely, the situation of TP, 
thus detection rate is defined as follows [20]:
 
DetectionRate= %100
.
.
×
ingsedfortestofsamplesuno
orrectlylassifiedcofsamplescno  
Or
 
Detection Rate = %100×
+ FNTP
TP
 
iv. False Positive
 
Rate
 
Another name is False Alarm Rate (FAR) 
measures the number of misclassified positive instances 
in relative to the total number of misclassified instances. 
Can be expressed also the proportion that normal data 
is falsely detected as attack behavior, namely, the 
situation of FP, thus false alarm rate is defined as 
follows [20]:
 
False Positive Rate= %100
.ln
.ln
×
lesoftestsampotota
lessifiedsampofmissclasotota
Or
 
False alarm rate = %100×
+TNFP
FP
Recall and Precision are two widely used 
metrics employed in applications where successful 
detection of one of the classes is considered more 
significant than detection of the other classes [].
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In general, intrusion detection systems require high 
v. Average Misclassification Cost (AMC)
 
AMC= N1 ∑∑
= =
5
1
5
1i j
CM (I, J)*C (I, J)
 
Where CM corresponds to confusion matrix, C 
corresponds to the cost matrix, and N represents the 
number of patterns tested [10].
 
IV. Data Collection and Preparation
 
NSL-KDD data set which is the new version of 
KDD Cup 99 dataset and the only publicly available [21] 
and the widely used data set for intrusion detection have 
been used for the experimental purpose. The process of 
data cleaning and preparation is highly dependent on 
the specific machine learning algorithm and software 
chosen and algorithms used for the machine learning 
task. The researcher attempted to prepare the data 
according to the requirements of the Tanagra which is 
powerful, user friendly and freely available for 
noncommercial purpose machine learning software [11] 
and according to the requirements of CS-MC4 and CS-
CRT algorithms by consulting different literatures. 
 
V. Training and Testing
 
Models
 
The Intrusion detection models were developed 
using cost sensitive classification tree CS-CRT and cost 
sensitive decision tree CS-MC4 algorithms on full 
training NSL-KDD dataset using a powerful machine 
learning and data mining Tanagra tool and then Full 
testing dataset of NSL-KDD passed through the 
developed models to detect the intrusions and find the 
detection error rates, precision, false positives rate, 
average misclassification cost and accuracy of the 
detection models but for comparison of models we used 
mainly average misclassification cost, false positives 
rate and accuracy of detection.
 
VI. Experimentation
 
We used data mining software tool known as 
Tanagra version 1.4.34 available freely at [11]. The 
software is a GUI based software and easy to use. 
Tanagra is capable of classifying large volumes of data 
within a second depending on the speed and 
specification of computer processor. All experiments 
were performed using an Intel Core 2 Duo Processor 
2.16 GHz processor with 4 GB of RAM and implemented 
on a Vista Windows operating system.
 
 
We have used NSL-KDD intrusion dataset which 
is available at [21] and it is  a  dataset  suggested  to  
solve  some  of  the  inherent  problems  of  the original  
KDD Cup 99  dataset [13,20]. The NSL-KDD dataset 
has the following advantages over the original KDD Cup 
99 dataset. 
 
1. It does not include redundant records in the training 
set, so the classifiers will not be biased towards 
more frequent records. 
 
2. There are no duplicate records in the proposed test 
sets, therefore the performance of the learners are 
not biased by the methods which have better 
detection rates on the frequent records. 
 
3. The number of selected records from each difficulty 
level group is inversely proportional to the 
percentage of the records in the original KDD 
dataset.
 
As a result the classification rates of distinct 
machine learning methods vary in a wider range, 
which makes it more efficient to have an accurate 
evaluation of different learning techniques. 
 
4. The number of records in the training and testing 
sets are reasonable, which makes it affordable to 
run the experiments on the complete set without the 
need to randomly select a small portion. 
 
5. Statistical observations, one of the most important 
deficiencies in the KDD dataset is the huge number 
of redundant records,
 
which causes the learning 
algorithms to be biased towards the frequent 
records and thus prevent them from learning 
unfrequent records which are usually more harmful 
to networks such as U2R and R2L attacks. 
 
Table2 and Table3 shows the statistics of the 
redundant records in the KDD Cup 99 training and 
testing datasets. 
 
Table 2 :
 
Statistics of redundant records in the KDD training dataset.
 
Original
 
Records
 
Distinct Records
 
Reduction Rate
 
Attacks
 
3,925,650
 
262,178
 
93.32%
 
Normal
 
972,781
 
812,814
 
16.44%
 
Total
 
4,898,431
 
1,074,992
 
78.05%
 
Table 3 
 
:  Statistics of redundant records in the KDD testing dataset
 
Original 
 
Records 
 
Distinct Records 
 
Reduction Rate
 
Attacks
  
250,436
  
29,378
  
88.26%
 
Normal
  
60,591 
 
47,911
  
20.92%
 
Total 
 
311,027
  
77,289
  
75.15%
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a) NSL-KDD Intrusion Detection Dataset:
 Evaluation Metrics 
We have used the cost matrix defined for the KDD Cup 99 Dataset [9] which is shown in Table 4. 
Category Normal Probe DOS U2R R2L 
Normal 0 1 2 2 2 
Probe 1 0 2 2 2 
DOS 2 1 0 2 2 
U2R 3 2 2 0 2 
R2L 4 2 2 2 0 
VII. Experimentation and Result 
The experimentations have two major parts; the 
first one is experimentation on CS-MC4 and CS-CRT 
using all the 41 attributes and the second is 
experimentation on CS-MC4 and CS-CRT using 
information gain
 
(IG) feature (attribute) selection 
method. Comparative discussions of each 
 
approaches
 
 
used with the KDD 99 winner results are given.
 Table 5 summarizes comparison results of 
detection accuracy (which refers to the proportion that a 
type of data is correctly classified) of normal and 4 
different attacks (i.e. Probe, Dos, U2R, R2L) based on 
CS-MC4 and CS-CRT classifiers using 24, 30, 37, and 
all the attributes in comparison with KDD winner results.
 
Table 5 : Performance comparison of testing result for five-class classification. 
 Normal DOS R2L Probe U2R 
Cs-
mc4 
Cs-
crt 
Cs-
mc4 
Cs-
crt 
Cs-
mc4 
Cs-
crt 
Cs-
mc4 
Cs-
crt 
Cs-
mc4 
Cs-
crt 
All attributes       98.71 92.91 99.85 97.44 91.69 61.46 98.80 99.66 72.50 17.50 
24 attributes 98.65 93.56 99.81 98.01 89.53 45.68 98.85 97.94 52.50 10.00 
30 attributes 98.61 98.25 99.81 99.64 91.20 88.87 98.85 99.04 77.50 20.00 
37 attributes 98.70 92.83 99.81 97.44 91.69 61.46 98.80 99.66 65.00 17.50 
KDD winner 99.5 97.1 8.4 83.3 13.2 
 
 It is evident from this Table that: 
1. For Normal: CS-MC4 classifiers outperform their 
CS-CRT counterparts in all cases but when only 30 
attributes are used, the difference between the 
accuracy of CS-MC4 and CS-CRT became minimal 
i.e. 0.36%. For this type of class, in all the cases the 
accuracy of the KDD winner result is better than 
both CS-MC4 and CS-CRT classifiers. 
2. For Probe attack: the accuracy of CS-MC4 is better 
than that of CS-CRT when only 24 attributes are 
used, but in other circumstances CS-CRT 
outperforms CS-MC4. For this type of attack, in all 
the cases the accuracy of both CS-MC4 and CS-
CRT is better than the KDD winner result. 
3. For Dos attack: CS-MC4 classifiers outperform their 
CS-CRT counterparts in all cases but when only 30 
attributes are used, the difference between the 
accuracy of CS-MC4 and CS-CRT became minimal, 
i.e. 0.17%. For this type of attack, in all the cases the 
accuracy of both CS-MC4 and CS-CRT is better 
than the KDD winner result.  
4. For U2R attack: the accuracy of CS-MC4 classifiers 
is better than their CS-CRT counterparts in all cases. 
For this type of attack, in all the cases the accuracy 
of both CS-MC4 and CS-CRT is better than the KDD 
winner result except when only 24 attributes are 
used for CS-CRT classifier.  
5. For R2L attack: accuracy of CS-MC4 classifiers is 
better than their CS-CRT counterparts in all cases. 
For this type of attack, in all the cases the accuracy 
of both CS-MC4 and CS-CRT are by far better than 
the KDD Cup 99 winner result. 
In general, it is evident from the above table that 
in terms of accuracy, CS-MC4 outperformed the CS-
CRT. As it can be seen from the result, the feature sele-
ction method used (i.e. information gain value) did not 
increase the accuracy of CS-MC4 classifier. Even 
though CS-MC4 classifier achieved the same result us-
ing all the attributes (41 attributes) and 37 attributes (at 
information gain value greater than 0), the reduction of 
the attributes from 41 to 37 could increase the speed of 
the classifier and reduce the space required. CS-CRT 
achieved a better result when only 30 attributes (inform-
ation gain value greater than and equal to 0.011) are 
used relative to the other cases. 
So, feature selection using information again 
value achieved better result for CS-CRT classifier from 
41 attributes to 30 attributes but for CS-MC4 classifier 
from 41 attributes to 37 attributes. Results which are 
achieved in this work are compared with the results 
obtained by KDD winner results as shown in table 4. As 
it can be seen, the accuracy of KDD Winner is only 
better in normal, but it is far worse than CS-MC4 and 
CS-CRT in U2R and R2L attacks; this might be because 
of the data used for this research is NSL-KDD intrusion 
dataset (which is new version of the original KDD cup 
data and it is better than the original dataset in that it 
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has no redundant data) but for the KDD winner the 
original KDD cup dataset is used.
a)
 
Table 6 summarizes the efficiency of inform-
ation gain value for feature selection and the 
performance comparison of CS-MC4, CS-CRT classifier 
and KDD winner result based on overall accuracy, false 
positives rate and average misclassification cost using 
24, 30, 37 and all the attributes for 5 attack classes on 
NSL-KDD dataset. 
 
Table 6  :
 
 Performance comparison of different methods.
 
 
Overall accuracy (%)
 
False positives rate (%)
 
Average Misclassification Cost
 CS-MC4
 
CS-CRT
 
CS-MC4
 
CS-CRT
 
CS-MC4
 
CS-CRT
 All attributes
 
98.9
 
94.2
 
1.3
 
7.1
 
0.0199
 
0.0895
 24 attributes
 
98.8
 
94.1
 
1.4
 
6.4
 
0.0232
 
0.0982
 30 attributes
 
98.8
 
98.4
 
1.4
 
1.7
 
0.0201
 
0.0335
 37 attributes
 
98.9
 
94.1
 
1.3
 
7.2
 
0.0199
 
0.0887
 KDD winner
 
92.7
 
0.55
 
0.2331
 
 It is evident from above table that:
 1. Overall accuracy of CS-MC4 classifiers is better 
than their CS-CRT counterparts in all cases. And in 
all the cases, the overall accuracy of both CS-MC4 
and CS-CRT is better than the KDD winner result.
 2. False positives rate of CS-MC4 classifiers are better 
than their CS-CRT counterparts in all cases. And in 
all the cases, the false positive rate of the KDD 
winner result is better than both CS-MC4 and CS-
CRT classifiers.
 3. Average misclassification cost of CS-MC4 classifiers 
is better than their CS-CRT counterparts in all cases. 
And in all the cases, the Average misclassification 
cost of both CS-MC4 and CS-CRT is better than the 
KDD winner result.
 4. Attribute reduction using information again value 
achieved better result for CS-CRT classifier from 41 
attributes to 30 attributes, from 94.2% to 98.4% 
accuracy, from 7.1% to 1.7%  false positive rate, 
and average misclassification cost from 0.0895 to 
0.0335; but for  CS-MC4 classifier it only reduce the 
attribute from 41 attributes to 37 attributes. 
 VIII. Conclusions 
This paper focuses on using cost sensitive 
learning techniques to existing data mining algorithms to 
deal with cost of different types of attacks in intrusion 
detection while at the same time reducing the false 
positives rate. The cost issue is widely ignored in the 
intrusion detection research. As a result, most of the 
research projects tried to minimize the false positives 
rate which may not reflect real-world scenario of dealing 
with ever increasing different types of attacks with 
different costs; and an important consideration is the 
fact that raising false alarms carries a significantly lower 
cost than not detecting attacks.
 
For comparison results of CS-MC4, CS-CRT 
and KDD 99 winner result, it was found that CS-MC4 is 
superior to CS-CRT in terms of accuracy, false positives 
rate and average misclassification costs. CS-CRT is 
superior to KDD winner result in accuracy and average 
misclassification costs but in false positives rate KDD 
winner result is better than both CS-MC4 and CS-CRT 
classifiers.
 
This paper proposed learning approach for 
network intrusion detection that performs feature 
selection method using information gain by selecting 
important subset of attributes. The performance of the 
proposed approach on the NSL-KDD intrusion detection 
dataset achieved a better accuracy from 94.2% to 98.4% 
for the CS-CRT classifier. It also reduced the false 
positives for the CS-CRT algorithm from 7.1% to 1.7%, 
and the average misclassification costs from 0.0895 to 
0.0335; but for the CS-CM4 algorithm, it only reduced 
the attribute from 41 to 37 attributes.Even though feature 
selection method could not increase accuracy or reduce 
false positive rate and average misclassification cost for 
CS-MC4, it could increase the speed of the classifier 
and reduce the computation space required. The 
experimental results have manifested that feature 
(attribute) selection improves the performance of IDS.
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